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Abstract
We develop a model of two-stage cumulative research and development (R&D), in which
one research unit (RU) with an innovative idea bargains to license its nonverifiable interim
knowledge exclusively to one of two competing development units (DUs) via one of two
alternative modes: an open sale after patenting this knowledge, or a closed sale in which
precluding further disclosure to a competing DU requires the RU to hold a stake in the licensed
DU’s postinvention revenues. Both modes lead to partial leakage of RU’s knowledge from its
description, to the licensed DU alone in a closed sale, and to both DUs in an open sale. The open
sale is socially optimal; yet the contracting parties choose the closed sale whenever the interim
knowledge is more valuable and leakage is sufficiently high. If the extent of leakage is lower,
more RUs choose open sales, generating a nonmonotonic relationship between the strength
of intellectual property rights and aggregate R&D expenditures and the overall likelihood of
development by either DU. (JEL: D23, O32, O34)
1. Introduction
We develop a model of two-stage cumulative research and development (R&D),
in which a research unit (RU, e.g., a biotech company) engages in research to
produce an interim innovative idea (“knowledge”). The idea has no value to con-
sumers, but it could be developed further into a marketable product by one of
two competing development units (DUs, e.g., large pharmaceutical companies).
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The latter are assumed to be far more efficient in developing the idea than the
original research unit itself, by virtue of having deep pockets, which would enable
them to avoid the incentive losses arising from external financing of development
costs and/or via owning specific complementary assets or skills. We study the
key trade-offs between different mechanisms for selling or licensing such ideas,
involving patenting of the knowledge or relying on trade secrets. We then char-
acterize when each of these licensing mechanisms is more likely to be chosen
and derive the implications of these choices for the structure of licensing fees.
In particular, we focus on contractual choices over (combinations of) lump-sum
versus revenue-contingent royalties, taking into account their impact on devel-
opment incentives, and the viability of exclusive licensing of interim innovative
knowledge.
These issues are certainly important in a modern economy. As Scotchmer
(1991, p. 24) notes, “Most innovators stand on the shoulders of giants, and never
more so than in the current evolution of high technologies, where almost all
technical progress builds on a foundation provided by earlier innovators.” In
2003, in-licensed products accounted for more than $70 billion in revenues for
the top 20 pharmaceutical companies (Wood Mackenzie 2004); on average, this
corresponds to a quarter of their total revenue now and is expected to increase
to 40% in a few years. The leading pharmaceutical companies have large R&D
budgets (about 15–20% of sales revenues) and yet rely increasingly on outside
research. For example, since 2000, GlaxoSmithKline has pursued a new approach
to R&D and has moved from two or three in-licensing deals per year to more than
10 per year (Morais 2003). Their restructuring paid off and other firms followed
their example, engaging in late- and early-stage licensing deals (Featherstone and
Renfrey 2004).
In other industries, such sequential innovation is also important, though the
nature of licensing arrangements varies greatly; outside of a small set of industries
(including biotech) the sellers of knowledge rely on secrecy rather than on patents
(Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh 2000). Also, inventors are paid in cash, in stock,
through participation in joint ventures, or via revenue-contingent royalties. For
example, while purchasing software technology for its Internet Explorer web
browser from Spyglass, Microsoft agreed to pay Spyglass about $1 per copy of
Internet Explorer distributed (Bank 1997). Even without wide use of patents,
software firms manage to generate substantial revenue from licensing; the market
for intellectual property licensing by software firms is estimated at $100 billion
a year (Srikanth 2003).
Several issues concerning the licensing of such intellectual property are of
substantial interest. Why do both in-house and in-licensed research coexist? Why
are some sales of ideas based on patents and others on trade secrets? What are the
roles of lump-sum fees versus contingent royalty payments in providing incentives
for R&D, and for exclusive licensing?
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We attempt to answer some of these questions within an incomplete contract
setup where two potential buyers of nonverifiable knowledge compete to obtain
a license to develop the knowledge. Unlike conventional incomplete contract
models, we take into account not only the fact that the value of such knowledge
is not verifiable, but also the imperfect excludability and nonrivalrous nature of
knowledge. Imperfect excludability implies that after an item of knowledge is
described to a potential buyer, he immediately captures a certain share of its
potential value. Indeed, utilization of at least part of the idea is a credible threat
which may weaken the seller’s bargaining position. On the other hand, the non-
rivalrous nature of knowledge makes it difficult for the seller to commit to an
exclusive sale: After selling knowledge to one buyer, the seller can sell it again to
another buyer. We explore the implications of alternative licensing mechanisms
that enable the seller to commit to exclusivity.
A conventional approach to assuring exclusivity is via patenting. Teece (2000
p. 22) writes, “Patents are in one sense the strongest form of intellectual property
because they grant the ability to exclude, whereas copyrights and trade secrets
do not prevent firms that make independent but duplicative discoveries from
practicing their innovations and inventions.” As Teece notes, the “doctrine of
equivalents” (of insubstantial differences), or of a similar “look and feel,” are
often applied much less stringently in trade secret or trademark litigation than
in those over patented inventions. As a result, the licensor of patented interim
knowledge finds it much easier to precommit to exclusive licensing thereof. If
she were to sell her knowledge to another developer, his final invention would
embody the same look and feel as the aspects of the knowledge codified in the
patent, and it would be thus denied a final invention patent. Of course, in reality
such enforcement of patents is only probabilistic, as in Anton and Yao (2004),
but for simplicity we will assume that patenting is a perfect means for exclusion.
However, patenting also involves a leakage of a certain portion of the knowl-
edge to the public in the process of filing a patent application. This is especially
important for most “tacit” (Teece 2000) or noncodifiable knowledge. Such knowl-
edge is difficult to protect using intellectual property rights (IPR) law, because
description of the codifiable features of an innovation in a patent nevertheless
leaves open many possibilities for inventing around the patent and creating a final
product without the same extent of similar look and feel as one that employed the
codifiable aspects of an idea, such as its molecular structure. For example, many
innovations in software create possibilities for inventing around, using detailed
source codes that differ from those in the original invention, but nevertheless uti-
lizing structural notions implicit in the patented idea. Description of an innovation
in a patent can then lead to a partial spillover of capabilities for second-stage inven-
tion, to parties other than the original innovator, or its licensee for the patented
idea. As Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh (2000) have noted on the basis of survey data,
in most US industries patents are considered less effective relative to alternative
“zwu005060387” — 2006/10/20 — page 1115 — #4
Bhattacharya and Guriev Patents vs. Trade Secrets 1115
mechanisms for protecting intellectual assets, such as secrecy and lead times,
because of knowledge spillovers arising from the descriptions involved in the
patenting process. As a result, in both the US and the EU (see Arundel and Kabla
1998 for the latter), a minority of innovations are patented, typically in industries
having highly codifiable inventions.
The alternative arrangement is to sell the knowledge privately, relying on trade
secrets. Trade secrets do not involve putting the description of the invention in
the public domain and therefore avoid the above-mentioned knowledge spillovers.
However, without patents it is difficult for the seller to commit to an exclusive sale.
Upon selling the innovation, the seller has incentives to resell the knowledge to
a competing buyer. The existing literature on collaborative research (e.g., Pisano
1989, ch. 3; Oxley 1999; Teece 2000; Majewski 2004) recognizes the risk of such
opportunistic disclosure as an important factor shaping the contractual environ-
ment and organizational structure.1 Indeed, it is difficult to punish the seller of the
knowledge for the second sale. Courts may refuse to enforce contracts that stip-
ulate a penalty for the knowledge seller in case of invention by a developer other
than her licensee, as long as they believe that this developer might have originated
similar knowledge on his own. As Denicolo and Franzoni (2004a, p. 367) note,
“Trade secret law does not protect the inventor from independent rediscovery,”
and that is exactly what this developer, who in fact benefited from a second sale
of knowledge by the RU, would claim.
We consider a more realistic mechanism for committing to exclusive sale
without patents. The original buyer gives the researcher a share of its future
revenues (through an equity stake or through royalties).2 The researcher’s share
may be quite substantial. Recently, a Japanese court enhanced the reward of an
inventor, holding a patent jointly with his ex-employer, from 20,000 to 20 billion
yen $189 million.3 Stakes are even higher in biotech-pharmaceutical licensing:
Hoffmann-La Roche’s recent deal with Antisoma included a lump-sum payment
of $43 million plus 10–20% of royalties on any products Roche brings to market.
In theory, payments to Antisoma could exceed $500 million if all existing prod-
ucts were successfully launched (Featherstone and Renfrey 2004). If the seller’s
revenue share is sufficiently high, the seller would prefer not to sell the knowledge
1. Teece (2000) and Pisano (1989) argue that in order to solve the problem of opportunistic use
of information, the parties should form alliances that provide adequate incentives through equity
participation (similar to the contingent contracts in our model). Majewski (2004) shows that the
risk of misappropriation of knowledge is substantial and it often results in limits on personnel
exchange in cooperative R&D. Oxley (1999) shows that the risk of opportunistic use of ideas shapes
organizational form of international R&D companies (consistent with our model’s predictions, the
higher the risk the more equity participation).
2. The choice of contracts on revenue rather than on net profit may be driven by concerns such as
in Anand and Galetovic (2000), of the possibility of the buyer inflating his reported expenditures to
hold up the seller of the knowledge.
3. “Inventor Wins a Round in Tokyo Court,” New York Times, January 31, 2004 Business Digest,
C3.
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to the first buyer’s competitors, because the value of the RU’s royalty stake is con-
tingent on the first buyer achieving a monopoly position in the product market.
Although others such as Pisano (1989) have also suggested a linkage between the
co-ownership of equity shares and preventing harmful opportunistic knowledge
disclosure, we are the first to fully analyze this mechanism taking into account
its effects on both buyers’ and sellers’ incentives.4
Even though this share-based mechanism (which we call the “closed” mode of
licensing) assures exclusive licensing, it does not come free of charge. The buyer’s
incentive to invest in development is more severely undermined the higher the
share of his final revenues he has to give away to the knowledge seller. We show
that this mechanism works better when the original idea is highly valuable. The
more valuable the knowledge, the higher is the probability of final invention by an
exclusive licensee. Hence, a clandestine sale of knowledge to a second developer
greatly diminishes the value of the knowledge seller’s expected revenue share in
the original licensee, by sharply lowering his prospects for sole invention. As a
result, for a higher level of knowledge the seller is induced to abide by an exclusive
license for a smaller share in the licensee’s future revenues. The buyer keeps a
higher share of his future revenue, which results in more efficient investment in
further development. Moreover, as we formally show, for the least valuable ideas
this revenue share mechanism ceases to function. If the seller’s revenue share is
low, the seller has an incentive to resell the knowledge to the competing buyer;
if it is high, the buyer does not invest much in development of the idea. The
value of the exclusive licensee is low, and the seller has no incentive to abide by
exclusivity.
We explicitly model the extensive form bargaining between the parties in
the patent-based and trade-secret-based modes of licensing, and find that the
parties are more likely to choose the nonpatented (or “closed”) mode of licens-
ing over patenting if the interim knowledge is highly valuable, and if describing
the knowledge involves substantial leakage. The intuition for the latter effect is
straightforward. On one hand, greater leakage in the patenting process makes
patenting a less attractive option. On the other hand, in closed sales, greater leak-
age via private description of knowledge is helpful, as then the seller would have
a weaker bargaining position in a clandestine opportunistic sale to the competitor
of the original buyer. As a result, a lower revenue share from the original licensee
would suffice to dissuade her.
4. After writing the first draft of this paper, we have also become aware of Lai, Riezman, and
Wang (2003), who deal with similar issues, albeit in a different framework. In particular, they
exogenously parameterize the effect of opportunistic disclosure on RU’s and DUs’ ex post revenues,
whereas we explicitly model a development race. The innovator appropriates a substantial part of
the surplus, because he can threaten the collaborators with the loss of ex post monopoly rents via
further disclosures. Although our closed mode of knowledge sales is based on a similar idea, unlike
Baccara and Razin (2002) we model our RU’s stake in her licensee DU’s ex post revenue as being
contractible.
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The explanation for more valuable knowledge being licensed privately fol-
lows from the detailed comparison of incentives in a revenue-contingent royalty
contract, with those arising via patenting before licensing. This comparison takes
into account two major effects. The first one is that the share of future revenue
that RU has to be given to assure no second sale is decreasing in the level of
knowledge. Thus, RU and her licensee DU capture a higher (but diminishing
in slope) proportion of the full potential value of interim knowledge as its level
increases.
The second effect has to do with the impact of higher levels of knowledge
on the nonlicensee DUs’ effort when patenting knowledge leads to nontrivial
enabling spillover of it to him. This effect is not monotonic in knowledge. We ana-
lyze the impact of leakage on development efforts as Nash equilibrium outcomes
in asymmetric contests for rents arising from final inventions. Higher knowledge
for the licensee initially increases not only his but also the nonlicensee’s invention
prospects, which later decrease as levels of licensed knowledge increase further.
Thus, the proportion of the potential value of RU’s knowledge—which would
have accrued to her and her licensee DU without spillovers—captured by her and
her licensee in patent-based licensing is first decreasing and then increasing in
RU’s knowledge level. Our result arises from these two key effects, plus the possi-
bility of nonexistence of revenue sharing contracts which would ensure exclusive
trade secret-based licensing for lower levels of knowledge.
Even though the trade-secret-based licensing is chosen for the more valuable
and less codifiable ideas, we show that it is socially suboptimal to the patent-based
mode. Indeed, the licensor-licensee coalition neglects the nonlicensee’s welfare
due to public knowledge disclosure via patents and the consumer surplus due to
product market competition between licensee and nonlicensee DUs.
The recent paper of Anton and Yao (2004) contains results related to ours
on the choice between patenting or otherwise at different levels of know-how
and protection of intellectual property rights. However, these are derived in a
context without cumulative R&D, in which the purpose of partial know-how
disclosure is to signal one’s cost level to product market competitors and rewards
from patenting consist of expected penalties derived from patent infringement
suits. These ex post infringement penalties are assumed to be independent of
the quality of disclosed knowledge. Anton and Yao also find that higher-valued
innovations (those reducing costs of production the most) would not be patented,
but protected as trade secrets with fairly low levels of disclosure. In contrast,
Denicolo and Franzoni (2004b), who endogenize the levels of imitation efforts
by noninnovators whenever the original invention is not patented, find that more
valuable inventions with larger markets are more likely to be patented, with others
relying on trade secrets. In our work, we endogenize knowledge licensing fees
via buyer-seller bargaining and rule out any outside imitation of interim (and
non-marketed) knowledge licensed via trade secrets.
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We then consider the implications of our results for the impact of intel-
lectual property protection—either legally as determined by the stringency and
enforcement of patents (IPR), or as determined by the nature of the technology that
is described prelicensing—on the overall extent of development expenditures, as
well as their productivity, aimed at final invention. We show that the trade-offs we
analyze may suffice to generate nonmonotonic relationships between the strength
of intellectual property protection (including IPR) and aggregate R&D expendi-
tures. In particular, depending on the ex ante distribution of the interim knowledge
levels, an interior degree of such protection may maximize overall levels and effi-
cacy of development efforts, when endogenous choices over licensing modes are
allowed, but that is not the case when attention is restricted to patented sales.
Earlier theoretical models pertaining to endogenous expenditures on imitation
as well as innovation, in the context of patented final inventions, have suggested
the possibility of a nonmonotonic, indeed ∩-shaped, relationship between the
strength of IPR protection as measured by patent length and R&D activity.5
A recent empirical study by Lerner (2001) provides some support for this con-
jecture. In our model, such an ∩-shaped relationship between the strength of
intellectual property protection—measured as the complement of the extent of
knowledge leakage prelicensing—emerges more simply, from the impact of such
protection on endogenous choices over knowledge licensing modes at different
levels of knowledge.
Our analysis develops the application of the incomplete contracting paradigm
by Grossman and Hart (1986) to the issues of incentive for R&D started by
Aghion and Tirole (1994), who analyzed knowledge licensing fees and their
implications for incentives to expend noncontractible efforts or invest in research
and development, by a RU incapable of development and a single DU incapable
of first-stage research. We also extend the important work of Anton and Yao
(1994), which considered rent extraction by an RU from a DU based on a threat
of knowledge disclosure to a competing DU, when leakage of knowledge arising
from its description is complete.6
Our paper is also related to the literature on foreclosure, exclusive dealing, and
vertical integration, surveyed in Rey and Tirole (forthcoming). The latter is also
concerned with the problem of precommitment, when a monopolistic upstream
5. An early theoretical argument for such a relationship between IPR protection in the form of
patent length and the expected value of resulting inventions was provided by Horwitz and Lai
(1996). Sakakibara and Branstetter (2001) have analyzed Japanese evidence on this issue, based on
the impact of patent reforms.
6. Earlier, Scotchmer and Green (1990) developed a two-stage model of cumulative R&D, in which
patenting (disclosure) of an interim innovation causes full leakage of its implications for second-
stage inventions to other RU-cum-DUs. They analyzed endogenous choices of the timing of patenting
under alternative IPR protection regimes. There are also recent papers by Jansen (2005) and Gill
(2006), who show that leakage can be strategic as it can actually weaken the competitors’ incentives
to invest in development.
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supplier can sell an intermediate input to multiple competing final goods producers
downstream. The upstream firm seeks to extract as much surplus as possible, via
strategic pricing of the input. In particular, several authors (for example, McAfee
and Schwartz 1994), model the possibility of the upstream firm making secret
input supply offers to a second downstream firm after reaching an agreement with
the first firm, and then elaborate on mechanisms such as vertical integration to
internalize the externalities involved. Our revenue-sharing mechanism for knowl-
edge sales based on trade secrets shares a similar flavor, as does a mechanism
analyzed by Cestone and White (2003) in which giving equity shares to a monop-
olistic lender may dissuade her from financing competing entrants. Our main
contributions are to consider also the alternative mechanism of patenting, which
also enables commitment to exclusive licensing and characterize how choices
across these mechanisms depend on some salient features of interim knowledge.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we set up our
model, describing its notation, timing, and the protocols of bargaining processes
involved in knowledge licensing. In Section 3, we characterize the equilibrium
choices over modes of licensing, and structure of fees across RU and her licensee
DU. In Section 4, we study comparative statics with respect to the degree of
protection of intellectual property, both analytically and numerically. Section 5
concludes.
2. The Model
2.1. The Setup
There are three risk neutral agents: a research unit RU and two competing devel-
opment units DU1 and DU2. These parties undertake research (by RU) and
development (by DUs) to create a new product. The investments in research and
development are sequential. First, RU produces knowledge K . This knowledge
has no value per se but is an input in the development stage that may result in
the creation of a new product. If only one DU develops successfully, he obtains
a monopoly rent of V = 1 in the product market. If two DUs succeed in devel-
opment, they compete à la Bertrand and both get zero rents. In this paper, we do
not focus on the knowledge generation process and take the level of knowledge
K ∈ [0, 1] as given. We assume K to be the outcome of an exogenous random
process with a density known ex ante.
For each DU, his probability P of successful development is a strictly
increasing and concave function of his acquired knowledge and subsequent costly
noncontractible development effort choice. For analytical tractability, we focus
on a functional form that allows us to characterize the equilibrium choices of
Pi by a DUi as linear functions of DUj ’s choice Pj , as well as RU’s ex post
revenue share. The intuition behind our results, elaborated in the Introduction
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Figure 1. Timing.
and subsequently, should hold for a wider range of such development probability
functions. We define, for effort levels E ∈ [0, 1/2] :
P = p(K,E) = √2KE. (1)
The development effort E is measured in terms of its cost. These are assumed
to be nonverifiable. Knowledge is metrized in terms of the maximum probability
of successful second-stage invention it could lead to. The constraint E ≤ 1/2
is to make sure that this probability cannot exceed 1. However, in all equilibria
considered in the paper E ≤ K/2 = arg maxE
[√
2KE − E], so this constraint
is never binding.
2.2. Timing
The timing of events is presented in the Figure 1.
Ex ante. RU obtains knowledge K .
Ex interim. The parties choose the mode of licensing of RU’s knowledge—open
or closed—and then bargain on the licensing fee contract.
Ex post. Successful developers compete à la Bertrand. If only one DU invents
successfully, he obtains a monopoly rent of V = 1. If both develop successfully,
both get zero (V = 0), which is also their payoff if neither invents.
2.3. Licensing Modes
The two alternative modes of knowledge licensing evolve as follows. (The
bargaining game in each mode, with and without patenting, is described in
Sections 2.4 and 2.5.)
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Open Mode. A patent (IPR) is registered, so that RU can commit to sell her
knowledge to one party only. This requires RU to describe her knowledge publicly,
which leads to a partial leakage of her knowledge; an exogenous proportion Lo ∈
[0, 1] of the knowledgeK is divulged to both DUs. Both DUs also infer the level of
RU’s knowledge K from this description. The firm i that licenses the full content of
RU’s knowledge pays RU a lump-sum fee Fo and chooses development effort Ei ;
the respective probability of development is Pi = p(K,Ei). The other firm j
chooses effortEj , and his probability of development isPj = p(LoK,Ej ). These
effort choices {Ei,Ej } form Nash equilibrium strategies in the game between the
two DUs with ex post payoffs contingent on their final inventions as described
below.
Closed Mode. Knowledge disclosure occurs through a private sale to one of
the DUs (randomly chosen by the RU). The parties bargain about a licensing
contract, with its payoffs contingent in part on DUi’s postinvention revenues. As
the ex post outcome is binary (V = 1 or V = 0), this contract includes only two
variables: a lump-sum transfer Fc from DUi to RU and RU’s share s (e.g., via
royalties) in DUi’s ex post revenues.
To initiate the bargaining RU provides a description of her knowledge, which
is sufficient for DUi to infer its level K . This description also leads to some partial
leakage of RU’s knowledge, LcK , to DUi , where Lc ∈ [0, 1] is also an exogenous
parameter. After RU and DUi agree on the terms of disclosure, RU reveals the full
content of her knowledge to the licensee DUi , and DUi chooses his development
effort Ei . We denote Pc as his corresponding probability of invention.
RU could also sell her knowledge to DUj subsequently. In this opportunistic
deviation by RU, she would first describe her knowledge causing leakage LcK to
DUj . If they agree on a fee for RU disclosing the full content of her knowledge,
DUj would then choose the probability of development Pd (where d stands for
“deviation”) given the DUi’s choice of Pc. If RU and DUj failed to agree upon the
licensing fee, DUj would develop on the basis of leaked knowledge; in this case
we denote his choice of probability of invention as Qd . By choosing the share s
appropriately, DUi will try to preclude RU’s knowledge disclosure to DUj . If s is
sufficiently high, RU could be interested in protecting DUi’s ex post rents from
competition; we characterize when this is feasible.
In our view, it is at least a plausible working hypothesis that proportions
of enabling knowledge leaked to potential licensees in private Lc and patent-
based Lo descriptions may be very similar—especially for an interim innovative
idea. For such innovations the final details of its implementation (e.g., the precise
product or manufacturing process) remain unclear. Although the description of
codifiable aspects of an innovation in a patent would preclude their replication
(via resale), prelicensing description of the idea in a closed-mode negotiation,
to establish its potential, might not need such aspects to be disclosed prior to
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Figure 2. Bargaining in the open mode.
reaching agreement on a licensing contract. If that is not the case, then Lc is
likely to exceed Lo.7 We should emphasize that even if Lc > Lo, in equilibrium
the spillover is greater in the open mode as the information is leaked to the public
domain, while in the closed mode only the buyer of the knowledge receives it.
2.4. Bargaining in the Open Mode
The multilateral bargaining game in the open mode is similar to the one in Bolton
and Whinston (1993). RU and the DUs bargain about full disclosure of knowl-
edge K . After patenting, RU makes an offer to DUi . The offer specifies the pay-
ment Fo for the exclusive disclosure of knowledge K to DUi . DUi either accepts
or declines the offer. In the former case, DUi develops on the basis of K , whereas
the competing DUj only has access to the leaked knowledge LK . If DUi declines
RU’s offer, RU makes an offer to DUj and so on (Figure 2). We analyze an infinite
horizon bargaining game, with parties having a common discount rate δ → 1.
Once the agreement on the terms of disclosure is reached, DU1,2 choose their
postlicensing levels of development effort E1,2 (equivalently, their probabilities
of successful development P1,2), as detailed previously.
We rule out patented sales to both DUs. We shall show that in the resulting
tripartite bargaining (e.g., see Bolton and Whinston 1993) this is always domi-
nated from RU’s point of view by an exclusive knowledge sale to one DU. The
RU is better off with the exclusive sale, even when licensing to both DUs may
increase total developers’ surplus ex interim. The rationale is that in the latter case
7. However, in some cases patenting may involve a greater extent of knowledge leakage than private
sales Lo < Lc. For example, the choice of process rather than product licensing in Indian patent law
for pharmaceutical innovations, prior to her joining the WTO, probably facilitated the development of
alternative processes for the same final product, by requiring patent applicants to disclose more fully
the original processes for manufacturing their products. In contrast, closed licenses for manufacturing
these products are likely to have resulted in similar levels of disclosure about innovators’ processes
only after agreement on royalties.
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Figure 3. Bargaining in the closed mode. Arrows indicate the equilibrium path.
RU would only get half of this total surplus, while under an exclusive sale the two
DUs compete à la Bertrand for a single license, modulo the DUs’ disagreement
option of development based on leaked knowledge. A formal proof is provided
in Section 3.
2.5. Bargaining in the Closed Mode
RU randomly chooses DUi to arrange a private sale. The bargaining in the closed
mode is a conventional bilateral alternating offer game as in Rubinstein (1982):
RU makes an offer of {s, Fc}; if DUi declines, it makes a counteroffer, and so on
(Figure 3).
The resulting sharing of payoffs must take into account the outside options of
both RU and DUi . RU has the option of patenting her knowledge for open mode
licensing. Once the IPR is registered, in the form of a patent, the two parties
cannot return to private sales. RU would therefore not enter into a closed mode
sale unless it would generate a total expected payoff for her (Fc + sPc) that at
least equals her equilibrium licensing fee Fo in the open mode.
Similar logic applies to DU’s outside option. As we will show below, in
equilibrium Fo is such that both DUs obtain equal net payoff in the open-mode
licensing. Hence either of them would reject any closed-mode offer from the
RU below what the nonlicensee DU would have in a patented sale based on
the enabling knowledge LcK that is disclosed to DUi in the course of closed-
mode negotiations. If Lc equals Lo, either party can force reversal to the open
mode during bargaining. We describe in subsequent sections how these concerns
affect their equilibrium choices over the modes of licensing.
2.6. Interim Payoffs
We will denote as Tc and To the total equilibrium ex interim expected surplus
of RU-cum–the licensee DU obtaining the full knowledge in the closed and in
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the open mode, respectively. We will denote as Uoi(Pi, Pj ;K) the expected ex
interim payoff of this DU in the development race in the open mode, whereas the
other DUj chooses probability of invention Pj to maximize Uoj (Pj , Pi;LoK).
According to (1), DUi’s effort cost is Ei = P 2i /(2K) so that in the open mode
Uoi =
[
(1 − Pj )Pi − P 2i /(2K) − Fo
]
, (2)
which increases in K and decreases in Pj . Because Fo is paid before the develop-
ment effort is chosen, the DUi’s payoff (2) is maximized at Pi = K(1−Pj ). The
competing DUj develops on the basis of leaked knowledge LoK; he maximizes
his payoff
Uoj =
[
(1 − Pi)Pj − P 2j /(2LoK)
]
by choosing Pj = LoK(1 − Pi).
Correspondingly, in the closed model of knowledge sale the licensee DU
obtains
Uc =
[
(1 − s)Pi − P 2i /(2K) − Fc
]
, (3)
where Pc is the optimal choice of Pi in this mode. The RU’s payoff consists of
the royalty sPc and the cash payment Fc made before the choice of development
effort. For simplicity, we assume that the nonlicensee DUj has no development
capabilities in equilibrium. The licensing terms, Fc and s, are chosen via bilateral
bargaining between RU and DUi; the contract terms incentivise RU not to sell
her knowledge do DUj .
2.7. Choice over Licensing Modes
In essence, the bargaining structure above implies that the choice of the mode
would be made according to whether or not the total (subgame-perfect) equilib-
rium payoffs summed across the RU and her licensee DU, {To,c} is higher in the
open or the closed mode of licensing, with the following two main exceptions.
If Lc is higher than Lo by a sufficient amount, then RU may not make a
closed-mode offer even when Tc > To. In the closed mode sale the licensee
DUi would not pay RU more than what he would gain from having the whole
knowledge K and his rival DUj none, as compared to DUi having knowledge
LcK and DUj having K , as in Anton and Yao (1994). This payment to RU could
be lower than Fo.
The other case is where K is such that the level of RU’s required revenue
share s to ensure an exclusive closed-mode sale is so high that RU has to make
a lump-sum payment to her licensee DUi , Fc < 0, to make DUi accept a closed
sale over a patented one. As RU’s wealth constraint precludes her making the
payment, the parties may choose to patent the knowledge even though Tc > To.
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This happens whenever Tc − sPc < To − Fo. We consider further implications
of this case in a companion paper (Bhattacharya and Guriev 2005).
3. Equilibrium Outcomes
In this section, we characterize the equilibrium payoffs of the RU and the DUs
under the alternative modes of disclosure at the ex interim stage. First, we derive
the joint surplus of the RU and her licensee DUi in the open and closed modes
of disclosure, To(K,Lo) and Tc(K,Lc), respectively. Then we study the choice
of licensing mode and describe the division of the surplus between RU and DUi .
All proofs are contained in the Appendix.
3.1. Open Mode
If a patent is registered then the exclusive licensee DUi pays RU a licensing fee
Fo and obtains knowledge K . At the same time, knowledge LoK is leaked to
the public domain, so the competing DUj can also engage in the development
contest. The joint surplus of RU and DUi will therefore equal To = [Uoi + Fo];
(see [2]). The competing DUj will use the leaked knowledge LoK , and will
therefore receive
[
(1 − Po)Qo − Q2o/(2LoK)
]
. Here the probabilities {Po,Qo}
satisfy the Nash equilibrium conditions
Po = arg max
p
[(1 − Qo)p − p2/(2K)] = K(1 − Qo),
Qo = arg max
p
[(1 − Po)p − p2/(2LoK)] = LoK(1 − Po).
For each pair of K and Lo the solution is unique:
Po = K(1 − LoK)1 − LoK2 and Qo =
LoK(1 − K)
1 − LoK2 . (4)
Note that Po is increasing in K for all Lo, whereas Qo is initially increasing
and then decreasing in K, approaching the limit of Qo = 0 as K → 1 for
all Lo < 1. Indeed, knowledge has two effects on incentives to exert effort.
There is a positive direct effect, and there is a negative indirect effect that works
via strategic response to the competing DU. The direct effect is stronger for the
licensee DU as it uses full rather than leaked knowledge. However, the magnitude
of the indirect effect is stronger for the nonlicensee DUj for higher levels of
knowledge K .
The RU’s fee F0 is determined as the outcome of the sequential offer bar-
gaining game described in the Section 2.4 above, emulating Bolton and Whinston
(1993).
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Lemma 1. In the open mode the licensing fee sets the licenses DUi to his
disagreement payoff: Either DU obtains the net payoff of
Uo
= Uoj (Qo, Po;LoK) = [(1 − Po)Qo − Qo/(2LoK)],
while RU obtains
Fo =
[
Po(1 − Qo) − P 2o /(2K)
]− [(1 − Po)Qo − Q2o/(2LoK)]
from DUi .
Essentially, this bargaining results in Bertrand competition between the two
DUs: RU extracts all the additional surplus of the licensee DU, making his par-
ticipation constraint bind. The intuition for this result is related to the nature of
patented IPR: RU holds full rights for an exclusive sale, and can choose whom to
sell her knowledge to.
Using (4) we obtain the equilibrium payoffs of the RU and DU in this mode:
To = K(1 − LoK)
2
2(1 − LoK2)2 ; Fo =
K(1 − Lo)
2(1 − LoK2) ;
Uo = To − Fo = K(1 − K)
2Lo
2(1 − LoK2)2 .
(5)
Both To(K,Lo) and Fo(K,Lo) increase in K and decrease in Lo for all K,Lo ∈
[0, 1]. On the other hand, either DU’s payoff Uo increases with Lo. Indeed, the
licensee DU receives her reservation utility which is equal to the payoff of a
nonlicensed DU; the latter clearly increases when the proportion of knowledge
that is leaked increases. However, unlike To and Fo, each DU’s payoff Uo is
first increasing and then decreasing in K , approaching zero as K → 1 for all
Lo < 1. This is an implication of the nonmonotonic relationship between K and
the nonlicensee’s effort Qo discussed above.
Remark 1. RU is better off with an exclusive sale than selling knowledge twice.
Indeed, suppose that RU decides to sell knowledge to both DUs. In equilibrium
each DU develops with probability Po = K/(1 + K); gross of the licensing fee,
each DU’s surplus is K/(2(1 + K)2); the solution is equivalent to (4) and (5) in
the limiting case Lo = 1. Following the proof in Bolton and Whinston (1993) for
the case of sales to both downstream firms, we find that each DU pays RU only
(K/(2(1 + K)2) − Uoj (Qo, Po;LoK))/2. Overall, RU collects
K
2(1 + K)2 −
K(1 − K)2Lo
2(1 − LoK2)2 =
K
2
1 − Lo
1 − LoK2
1 − LoK4
(1 + K)2(1 − LoK2)
<
K
2
1 − Lo
1 − LoK2 = Fo.
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Therefore, even though the total DUs’ surplus is larger, RU can only capture a
small part of this surplus and is therefore not willing to sell to both DUs.
3.2. Closed Mode
If the contracting parties do not register a patent but choose disclosure via a closed
sale, there is no leakage to outsiders in equilibrium. However, in order to provide
RU with incentives not to disseminate knowledge to the competing DUj , DUi has
to give away a sufficient share s of his ex post revenues in royalties to RU. The
formal condition is that the reduction in the RU’s royalties due to opportunistic dis-
closure to DUj must weakly exceed the maximum fee that RU may get from DUj :
sPc − sPc(1 − Pd) ≥
[
(1 − Pc)Pd − P
2
d
2K
]
−
[
(1 − Pc)Qd − Q
2
d
2LcK
]
, (6)
where Pc is chosen by the licensee DUi and {Pd,Qd} are the potential choices
of the other DUj if the RU attempts to sell knowledge to her. Pd would be cho-
sen by DUj if she had full knowledge, and Qd would be her choice with leaked
knowledge LcK .
For a given share s, the left-hand side in (6) is the reduction in the RU’s payoff
because of opportunistic disclosure to DUj . The right-hand side is the maximum
licensing fee that RU may extract from DUj in case she decides to disclose to
him after licensing her knowledge to DUi . The logic of calculating this licensing
fee is very similar to the one in open sales: Because the process of negotiating
the fee results in a partial leakage of knowledge LcK , RU can obtain from DUj
at most the expression in the right-hand side. If and only if (6) is violated, there
exists a fee that DUj will be willing to pay and RU will be willing to accept in
exchange for the clandestine second sale. RU’s incentives for exclusive disclosure
come from the fact that selling the knowledge to a competing DUj dilutes the
DUi’s expected payoff and thus reduces the value of RU’s royalty stake from sPc
to sPc(1 − Pd) as described in the left-hand side of (6).
Although giving a sufficiently high share of ex post revenues to RU rules
out opportunistic disclosure, it comes at a cost of lowering the licensed DU’s
incentives to apply effort. Indeed, by solving for optimal effort of DUj and DUi
we find that Pc decreases in s:
Pd = arg max
p
[(1 − Pc)p − p2/(2K)] = K(1 − Pc); (7)
Qd = arg max
q
[(1 − Pc)q − q2/(2LcK)] = LcK(1 − Pc); (8)
Pc = arg max
p
[(1 − s)p − p2/(2K)] = K(1 − s). (9)
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In equilibrium, RU and DUi will choose the minimum possible s ∈ [0, 1]
that satisfies (6). Canceling the sPc terms in the left-hand side of (6) and using (7)
and (8), we rewrite the incentive constraint as
sPcPd ≥ K(1 − Pc)2/2 − LcK(1 − Pc)2/2. (10)
By substituting (7) and (9) into (10), we obtain a quadratic inequality
sK(1 − s) ≥ (1 − K(1 − s))(1 − Lc)/2. (11)
Lemma 2. A mechanism for a closed knowledge sale, which is incentive-
compatible for no further disclosure by the RU, requires RU to be given a share
s = s∗(K;Lc) in her licensee DU’s postinvention revenues, where s∗(K;Lc)
satisfies
s∗(K;Lc) =
(
1 + Lc −
√
(1 + Lc)2 − 8(1 − Lc)(1/K − 1)
)
/4 < 1/2.
(12)
The licensee DU develops with probability Pi = Pc = K(1 − s∗(K;Lc)), the
other DU does not develop.
This closed mode licensing is only feasible if such s∗(K;Lc) exists, that is,
whenever K ≥ Kˆ(Lc), where
Kˆ(Lc) =
(
1 + (1 + Lc)
2
8(1 − Lc)
)−1
. (13)
This result is intuitive; the monopoly rents of DUi suffice to overcome RU’s
temptation to disclose to the other DU whenever the level of interim knowledge
is high enough. If K < Kˆ(Lc), then the private disclosure to one DU cannot
be arranged because of the adverse incentive effect on DU’s effort. In order to
increase the RU’s stake, DUi gives RU a higher share s. However, as s increases,
DUi’s effort decreases, so that Pc falls. Hence, the competing DUj is prepared to
pay more for the knowledge: the lower Pc, the higher the payoff to DUj ’s effort.
At lower levels of interim knowledge K < Kˆ(Lc), RU’s returns to opportunistic
disclosure (the right-hand side in [6]) increase in s so rapidly that the benefits of
keeping DUi a monopoly (the left-hand side in [6]) never catch up with it. Because
Pc = K(1−s), sPc reaches its maximum at s = 1/2, implying s∗(K;Lc) ≤ 1/2.
The closed mode is feasible over a larger range of K when leakage Lc is high,
because RU’s payoff from a deviant second sale declines when Lc increases.
Indeed, Kˆ(Lc) decreases in Lc from Kˆ(0) = 8/9 to Kˆ(1) = 0.
Whenever the closed mode is incentive-compatible, the RU’s share s∗(K;Lc)
decreases with K and with Ls . The higher K, the higher the payoff to the
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monopoly development. Because higher K increases the probability of successful
development, if there were two competing developers there would be a high cost
of ex post rent dissipation due to Bertrand competition. Therefore RU has incen-
tives not to disclose to the second DU even if her share s is small. Furthermore,
the value of RU’s stake in post-invention revenues sPc decreases in K .8 Clearly,
whenever s = s∗(K;Lc) exists, it decreases in K, and so that right-hand side of
(11) decreases in K . Therefore the left-hand side sK(1−s) = sPc also decreases
in K . The joint surplus of RU and DUi
Tc = Pc − P 2c /(2K) = K
(
1 − s∗(K;Lc)2
)
/2 (14)
is increasing in K . This joint surplus is concave in K and approaches K/2 as K
increases; although s∗(K;Lc) decreases in K, its rate of decrease slows down at
higher levels of K . Indeed, s∗(K,Lc) is convex in K as s∗(K,Lc) is a negative
linear function of a square root of concave function of K .
Unlike in the open mode where the joint surplus of RU and the licensed DUi
decreases in leakage Lo, joint surplus Tc in the closed mode increases with Lc. If
Lc is higher, RU would receive less from the competing DUj ; the opportunistic
disclosure option is less attractive. Hence, DUi can give RU a lower share of ex
post revenues; his development effort and probability of successful development
Pc rise. This also leads to a higher joint surplus Tc(K,Lc) when Lc rises, because
the share s∗(K;Lc) falls (see equation [14]). If the leakage Lc is low then the
closed mode is only feasible for very high K; as shown above for Lc = 0, the
closed mode only exists at K ≥ 8/9.
3.3. The Choice of the Mode of Disclosure
In this section, we show that the parties choose the closed mode over the open
mode if Lo,Lc, or K are sufficiently high. If the leakages Lo,Lc are low, the
open mode dominates the closed mode. If Lo is close to zero, the joint surplus of
RU and DUi is not undermined by the competing DUj ; ex interim joint surplus
To is close to its maximum maxp[p − p2/(2K)] = K/2. Moreover, for low Lc
the risk of opportunistic disclosure in the closed mode is high, so DUi has to give
RU a very high revenue share; hence his probability of successful development
is lowered. As the leakage in either mode rises, open sales become less efficient,
while closed sales produce a higher surplus to RU and licensee DUi .
8. As well as other results, the fact that sPc decreases in K is not an artifact of a specific functional
form. Indeed, the incentive compatibility constraint requires that s = s∗(K,L) satisfies sPcPd =
Ud(Pd) − Ud(Qd), where Ud denotes the DUj ’s payoff gross of any payments to RU. In other
words, sPc = [Ud(Pd) − Ud(Qd)]/Pd , so that sPc declines with K whenever the right-hand side
does, which is likely as long as Ud(Pd) is weakly concave in K , and leakage is weakly convex in K .
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The closed mode is also more efficient for high K . The higher K the more
valuable the monopoly DU’s rent, hence the threat of opportunistic disclosure in
the closed mode is less important. On the other hand, if K is low, K < Kˆ(Lc),
then a private sale to one DU is infeasible (s∗(K;Lc) does not exist), so the open
mode is chosen. These observations can be generalized, to the following single-
crossing property of the impact of K on the combined surpluses of RU and DU
in each mode (Figure 4).
Proposition 1. If the closed mode of knowledge sale is more efficient for RU–
DUi coalition for some K˜, then it is also more efficient for all K ≥ K˜ . There exists
a K∗(Lo, Lc) ≥ Kˆ(Lc) such that Tc ≥ To for all K ≥ K∗(Lo, Lc), whereas if
K < K∗(Lo, Lc) the closed mode either does not exist or is dominated by the
open mode Tc < To.
Figure 4. The graph presents joint surplus as a share of K/2 (i.e., surplus if there were no leakage
in the open or no threat of second sale in the closed mode). In the closed mode, Tc/(K/2) is concave
in K , whereas in the open mode To/(K/2) is convex in K .
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For different combinations of leakage coefficients Lo,Lc, the comparison of
Tc(K;Lo) and To(K;Lc) satisfies one of three cases (Figure 4).
(1) There is a case where the closed mode is more efficient whenever s∗(K)
exists: Tc ≥ To for all K ≥ Kˆ(Lc).
(2) In the second case, the structure is different: At K being Kˆ(Lc) or some-
what higher, the open mode dominates. As K increases above Kˆ(Lc), Tc
grows faster than To, and eventually overtakes it at some point K∗(Lo, Lc) ∈
(Kˆ(Lc), 1). As K increases further, the closed mode remains more efficient;
Tc > To up until K = 1.
(3) The third case is that of perfect IPR protection Lo = 0. In this case, the open
mode is always optimal: To = K/2 > Tc for all K < 1.
The parties’ payoffs depend both on the joint surplus and on their outside
options. The RU has an outside option of choosing the open mode of knowledge
sale with payoffs {Fo, To − Fo} to RU and DUi , respectively. Once the IPR is
registered, in the form of a patent, the two parties cannot return to private sales.
The DUi’s outside option is more complex. If Lc ≥ Lo, once the closed mode
bargaining begins, DUi can ensure a payoff of To(K;Lc)−Fo(K;Lc). If DUi is
made an offer with a lower payoff, then DUi would reject RU’s closed mode offer;
as DUi has already obtained leaked knowledge LcK, RU’s best continuation
strategy is to patent the knowledge and to license it to DUi . To simplify the
solution of the game, we consider the case where Lo = Lc = L and return to a
more general setup at the end of the section.
In the case Lo = Lc = L, DU’s outside option becomes To(K;L) −
Fo(K;L) and the following result holds.
Proposition 2. Suppose that Lc = Lo. The outcome of the bargaining game
is as follows. The RU and her licensee DU i choose the mode of disclosure that
maximizes their joint surplus. If To > Tc then the RU and DU i’s payoffs are
{Fo, To − Fo}. If To ≤ Tc, then their payoffs are as follows
{Tc/2, Tc/2} if Tc/2 ≥ Fo and Tc/2 ≥ To − Fo,
{Fo, Tc − Fo} if Tc/2 < Fo,
{Tc − To + Fo, To − Fo} if Tc/2 < To − Fo.
These formulas are very intuitive. Efficient bargaining implies maximization
of the joint surplus, which is split in equal proportions as long as the outside
options do not bind. If the open mode is suboptimal (To < Tc), then the outside
option can bind for at most one party. The precise division of the surplus Tc in
such a sale is unimportant for our qualitative results, however. For an analysis
of buyer-seller bargaining under asymmetric information about the knowledge
level K , see d’Aspremont, Bhattacharya, and Gerard-Valet (2000).
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Figure 5. The optimal mode of licensing as a function of K and Lo = Lc = L. The (K,L) space
is partitioned by two curves Kˆ(L) (lower line) and K∗(L) (upper line). For a given L, Kˆ is the
minimum level of knowledge for which the closed mode exists, K∗ is the minimum level at which
the closed mode dominates the open mode. The two curves coincide for all L ∈ [0.25, 0.91].
Figure 5 presents K∗ and Kˆ as functions of L. Notice that both Kˆ(L) and
K∗(L) decrease with L. In the areas where K ∈ (Kˆ(L),K∗(L)), closed mode
sales exist but are dominated by the open mode. The figure shows that these
domains are small relative to the regions where the closed mode dominates the
open mode (K > K∗(L)) or where the closed mode is not incentive-feasible (K <
Kˆ(L)).9 This emphasizes the importance of analyzing the incentive-feasibility of
the closed mode when studying the endogenous choice over licensing modes.
9. The details of the calculations that determine the properties of the two curves in Figure 5 are
available upon request.
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3.4. Robustness and Extensions
Opportunistic Disclosure in the Closed Mode. Our analysis is based on the
assumption that trade secrets—unlike patents—do not protect the licensee from
the opportunistic disclosure by the licensor to competing user of knowledge. This
risk is certainly very important in the knowledge licensing environments and can
hardly be mitigated by contracts where RU’s fees are contingent on discovery by
the other DUj (like in Anton and Yao 1994). Such contracts are unlikely to be
enforceable under standard tort law as (i) it is hard to specify the invention; and
(ii) DUj could in principle discover the idea independently of RU.
Even if these contracts were feasible, they would have only a limited impact
on our results. Indeed, suppose that instead of the stake s in DUi revenues, RU
has to pay a penalty ϕ (e.g., to a third party) in case DUj invents.10 RU’s wealth
constraint implies ϕ ≤ Fc, where Fc is the lump-sum fee paid by DUi to RU.
The strongest incentives are provided when ϕ = Fc, hence the left-hand side
of the incentive compatibility constraint (6) becomes FcPd . This implies Fc ≥
(1−Lc)(1−K)/2. Such contracts are not individually rational for DUi whenever
K < (1 −Lc)/(2 −Lc) (for these K the DU’s payoff Tc −Fc is negative). Also,
for K < (1 −Lc)/(13/8 −Lc), DUi strictly prefers the contract with positive s.
Differential Leakages in Open and Closed Mode. As discussed, we believe
that it is reasonable to assume similar leakages across the modes for interim
nonmarketable innovations: Lc = Lo. The results, however, hold if Lc is slightly
higher than Lo. Indeed, in this case the proofs of Proposition 1 and Lemma 3 can
be easily reproduced.
The less likely cases are the ones where Lc is lower or substantially higher
than Lo. In the latter case there may emerge a situation where the RU’s maximum
payoff in the closed mode Tc(K;Lc) − [To(K;Lc) − Fo(K;Lc)] is below her
open mode fee Fo(K;Lo). Expecting a low payoff in the closed mode, RU will
prefer the open mode even if the joint surplus were higher in the closed mode.
However, this change does not affect the “monotonicity” of the mode choice: The
closed mode is still selected only for high K .11
10. In an unpublished appendix, we explore these issues in full detail studying arbitrary contracts
contingent on 2×2 = 4 outcomes of discovery by each DU. It turns out that the results are very similar.
Although more general contracts do reduce inefficiency because of the binding IC constraint, the
equilibrium arrangements still involve a positive royalty stake s > 0 and have the same comparative
statics properties.
11. We have not been able to produce a simple analytical proof, but the numerical calculations do
show that it is the case for all Lc, Lo,K . We have also found that the situation where RU prefers
open mode even if the joint surplus is higher in the closed mode does require Lo to be substantially
below Lc and K being very close to Kˆ(Lc). For example, if Lc = 0.9, it only occurs for Lo ≤ 0.78;
if Lc = 0.5, it requires Lo ≤ 0.28.
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Although the case Lo > Lc is less realistic, it is also covered by our analysis.
Here the DU’s outside option in the closed mode is less attractive, and therefore
RU expects to receive a higher payoff in the closed mode. Thus RU may want to
stick to the closed mode as the open mode would only provide her with a low fee
Fo(K;Lo). However, if the total surplus is higher in the open mode, DUi will
pay RU for patenting (as the knowledge is not contractable, the payment should
be contingent on the fact of patenting per se). A full-blown analysis—which we
do not undertake in this paper—should also take into account a potential for a
war of attrition between the two DUs. As both DUs benefit from switching to the
open mode, each can wait for the other one to pay the RU for patenting.
Competition in the Final Product Market. We have assumed Bertrand com-
petition between DUs in the market for the final product. This is an extreme
assumption, but our results hold in other duopoly settings as long as the monopoly
inventor receives a higher rent than a duopolist. In cases other than Bertrand where
the duopolists obtained nontrivial rents ex post, the value of exclusive license
would be lower; it would be harder to provide incentives for the RU in the closed
mode. The closed mode would be less efficient and would be less likely to be
chosen.
RU’s Financial Constraint. The previous solution neglects the RU’s ex interim
financial constraint. We assume that RU’s payoff consists of a stake in DUi’s
revenues worth sPc, and a lump-sum transfer Fc. If RU is financially constrained,
then one needs to take into account the fact that this transfer cannot be negative,
Fc ≥ 0. The results would not change much. Straightforward calculations yield
Fc = (1 − 3s)(1 − s)K/4. Therefore, the financial constraint is not binding
whenever s∗(K,Lc) ≤ 1/3. If s∗(K,Lc) > 1/3, then there is no way to arrange
a closed sale without violating RU’s financial constraint: s∗(K,Lc) is the lowest
royalty stake that still prevents opportunistic disclosure. If RU and DUi agree on
an even higher stake s > s∗(K,Lc), then the lump-sum payment Tc/2 − sPc
would decrease further. Indeed, Tc/2 decreases in s, while sPc = sK(1 − s)
increases in s for all s ≤ 1/2. Yet, even if s∗(K,Lc) > 1/3, the closed mode
may still be chosen: if Tc > To and Tc − sPc is above To −Fo, the DU will agree
to a closed mode license with Fc = 0.
4. IPR Protection and Aggregate Development Effort
In this section, we study how the endogenous choice of the licensing mode affects
the relationship between IPR protection and the aggregate development expendi-
ture in the economy. Our model accounts for a number of countervailing effects,
some of which have not been discussed before in the literature. In addition to
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the well-studied trade-off between incentives for the licensee and dissemination
of information in the open mode, we also model the effect of leakage on the
development expenditure in the closed mode and on the choice of the mode.
Our analysis of the mode choice above (Proposition 1) has straightforward
implications for the comparative statics of the relative strength of these effects.
Suppose that the economy is populated by RUs with high knowledge levels K (as
well as of high Lo and Lc); in this case the relationship is driven by the effects in
the closed mode. If the majority of RUs have less valuable ideas and the leakage
is low, the open mode effects will be more important. In the intermediate cases,
the relationship will be driven by the mode-switching effect.
We show that in some cases it is the latter effect that generates the ∩-shaped
relationship between protection of intellectual property and aggregate develop-
ment expenditure. To illustrate the importance of the mode-switching effect we
will first analyze the impact of leakage Lo and Lc on the social welfare.
4.1. Welfare Analysis
In this section, we compare a measure of social welfare in the two modes for
given parameters K,Lc, and Lo. We calculate expected social welfare as the
probability of (not necessarily sole) final invention net of development costs.
Proposition 3. For all K,Lc, Lo, social welfare is always higher in the open
mode rather than in the closed mode. The social welfare in the open mode,
Po(1 − Qo) + Qo(1 − Po) + PoQo − P
2
o
2K
− Q
2
o
2LK
= K
2
(
1 + Lo(1 − K)
2
1 − LoK2
)
,
(15)
monotonically increases with both K and Lo. The social welfare in the closed
mode, Pc − P 2c /(2K) = Tc, monotonically increases with both K and Lc.
Proposition 3 emphasizes the importance of knowledge spillover for social
welfare. First, the higher the leakage, the higher is our welfare measure in either
mode. Second, the closed mode is always dominated by the open mode in terms
of social welfare, even if it is less efficient from the point of view of the RU–DUi
coalition. This coalition does not internalize the payoffs to the competing DUj ,
nor to the consumers who benefit from a higher probability of invention due to
the development contest between the two DUs.
Proposition 3 has straightforward normative implications. If the patent law
is designed to maximize welfare, the regulators choose the highest possible Lo.
As we argued above, it is difficult to raise Lo above the technologically driven
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leakage in the closed mode Lc; this simple result provides yet another argument
in favor of the case with Lo = Lc.
Although Proposition 3 implies positive effect of leakage Lo,c on welfare for
a given mode, the relationship between leakage and welfare is not monotonic.
Indeed, an increase in either Lo or Lc implies a more likely switch from the open
mode to the closed mode; as, for a given K, the welfare is higher in the open mode
(Proposition 3), this brings about a lower welfare. Therefore the mode-switching
effect can generate ∩-shaped relationship between IPR protection and welfare,
even though for a given mode the relationship is monotonic.
4.2. Leakage, IPR Protection, and R&D Incentives
One has to be cautious in interpreting the welfare results. Unlike development
expenditures, full social returns to R&D are difficult to characterize and measure
in reality; there are many more spillovers and externalities besides those described
in our model. This is why empirical studies focus on the relationship between IPR
protection and R&D rather than social welfare (Lerner 2001).
For simplicity, we proxy the level of IPR protection by 1 − Lo and the
aggregate level of development expenditure by E1 + E2. We first consider the
role of IPR protection for a given mode of disclosure. If the knowledge is disclosed
through open sales, then better IPR protection improves the incentives to develop
for the licensee DUi , but also weakens nonlicensee DUj ’s incentives. Given K
and Lo, the total development effort by DU1 and DU2 in the open mode is
Eo = Ei + Ej = P
2
o
2K
+ Q
2
o
2LoK
= K
2
(1 − LoK)2 + Lo(1 − K)2
(1 − LoK2)2 .
Proposition 4. In the open (patent-based) mode of knowledge sales the total
development effort Eo either monotonically increases with Lo (for K ≤ 1/3) or
has a ∪-shape (if K > 1/3). In the latter case, the minimum point of the ∪-shape
L∗o = (3K − 1)K−2(3 − K)−1 is an increasing function of K .
This result is explained by the relative strength of the countervailing effects
of IPR protection on licensee and nonlicensee efforts. If IPR protection is strong
(Lo = 0), then a small decrease in it has a greater impact on DUj than on DUi , so
the effect is more important. The positive effect on the licensee DUi is relatively
more important if K is high (and therefore the difference between K and LoK
is high). When K is low (K < 1/3), leakage spurs subsequent development
efforts; this range of parameters corresponds to the case of early stages of new
technologies such as drugs development based on new findings and techniques
in biotechnology research.
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In the closed mode, DUj does not develop in equilibrium. The threat of
opportunistic disclosure makes DUi give RU a higher share in postinvention
revenues which distorts DUi’s development effort. The higher the leakage Lc,
the less important this threat, hence RU’s incentive constraint is satisfied through
a lower revenue share s. As a result, Pc and development effort decrease as
intellectual property retention (1 − Lc) increases for all K for which s∗(K;Lc)
exists.
Finally, consider the endogenous choice of the mode of disclosure. If either
Lo or Lc is sufficiently high, parties switch from open to closed mode which at
the margin results in lower aggregate development expenditure. Indeed, consider
the case of Lo = Lc = L, and L < 0.25 or L > 0.91. In this case, the switching
occurs at the point where Tc = To. At this point, the total cost of development is
greater in the open mode: by definition,
Tc = sPc + (1 − s)Pc − P 2c /(2K) = Pc(1 + s)/2 = To = Po(1 − P˜o)/2.
Because the total effort in the closed mode (1 − s)Pc/2 is below Pc(1 + s)/2, it
is also below Po(1 − P˜o)/2 + (1 − Po)P˜o/2 which is the total effort in the open
mode.12
Therefore, there are four effects of stronger IPR protection in the open mode
and of stronger intellectual property retention in the closed mode on the total
effort by DUs:
(A) effect on the licensee’s effort in the open mode (negative effect of Lo);
(B) effect on the nonlicensee’s effort in the open mode (positive effect of Lo);
(C) effect on the DU’s effort in the closed mode (positive effect of Lc);
(D) effect of switching from closed to open mode (negative effect of either Lo
or Lc). The latter two effects are associated with the closed mode and are
therefore relatively more important for higher knowledge levels K and for
higher levels of knowledge leakage (Lo or Lc).
12. In the case L∈ [0.25, 0.91], switching occurs at K = Kˆ(L), and Tc(Kˆ(L);L)>To(Kˆ(L);L),
so more cumbersome calculations are required. Still, after substituting K = Kˆ(L) and
s∗(Kˆ(L);L) = (1 + L)/4—its maximum possible value—into expressions for total effort in open
and closed mode we find that switching to the closed mode reduces total effort, at the level
of knowledge K = Kˆ(L). We need to determine the sign of Eo − Ec at K = Kˆ(L), where
Ec = P 2c /(2K) = K(1 − s)2/2 is the development effort in the closed mode. The sign is positive
whenever
(1 − LKˆ(L))2 + L(1 − Kˆ(L))2
(1 − LKˆ2(L))2 > (1 − (1 + L)/4)
2.
The latter inequality holds. The right-hand side is below 9/16 for all L ∈ [0, 1], and the minimum
value of the left-hand side is 0.83. Indeed, the left-hand side decreases in L for all L < 0.52 and
then increases in L; at L = 0.52 the left-hand side equals 0.83.
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As shown above in Proposition 4, in the open mode total noncontractible
development expenditures as a function of (1 − Lo) may be monotonic or
∪-shaped, but may never have ∩-shape. Therefore an “∩-shape” relationship
between these cannot be produced by the effects (A) and (B) alone. Once the
closed mode is introduced, so that the effects (C) and (D) are added, the ∩-shape
may indeed emerge for a broad range of parameters. Suppose that the follow-
ing conditions hold: the outcomes in the open mode mostly result in a negative
effect of IPR protection on the development expenditures; effect (B) prevails over
A. In the closed mode, positive effect (D) dominates negative effect (C). Both
possibilities arise when the prospects for higher levels of K are not too high.
Then as IPR protection declines from perfect, the development expenditures first
rise (open-mode effect); when IPR protection becomes sufficiently weak, the
mode-switching effect (D) is more important.
4.3. A Numerical Example
In this section, we illustrate the analysis above with a numerical example. To
capture the mode-switching effect (D), our example has to depart from studying
the relationship at a given K; rather, we consider a continuous distribution of dif-
ferent knowledge levels K . For simplicity’s sake, we take a family of exponential
distributions on K ∈ [0, 1] :
g(K) = λe
−λK
1 − e−λ (16)
The extreme cases of this family are the uniform distribution for λ = 0 and a
distribution with a mass point at K = 0 at λ = ∞. The higher the value of λ, the
lower the average knowledge level E[K] = ∫ 10 Kg(K)dK = λ−1 − (eλ − 1)−1.
We will consider two cases. First, we assume Lc = Lo = L (see the discus-
sion in Section 2.3) and study the effect of variation in L. Here the changes in
L correspond to technologically induced variations in leakage when describing
knowledge. In the second case, we will analyze the situation where much of what
is codified in patents must be revealed in closed sales to convey the level of K to
the buyer (as in Anton and Yao 1994). We therefore study the effect of change
in Lo alone, holding Lc constant at a high level. Variations in Lo here reflect the
strength of patent law and its implementation, which essentially serve to define
what is considered protected.
Leakage and Development Expenditures. We first consider the caseLo =Lc =L.
Figure 6 shows the relationship between L and the aggregate development expen-
ditures for different values of λ, averaged out over K ∈ [0, 1] according to the
density function (16). We present the equilibrium level of investment where the
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Figure 6. The aggregate development expenditures E = E1 +E2 and the welfare 1− (1−P1)(1−
P2)−E as a function of leakageL in the caseLo = Lc = L. The bold line shows the relationship given
the equilibrium (i.e., ex interim privately optimal) mode of disclosure. The thin line is the aggregate
development expenditure in the open mode (as if the closed mode were ruled out exogenously). The
three scenarios are High K (λ = 0, E[K] = 0.5, g(1)/g(0) = 1), Medium K (λ = 3, E[K] = 0.28,
g(1)/g(0) = 0.05), and Low K (λ = 7, E[K] = 0.14, g(1)/g(0) = 0.0009).
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mode of disclosure is chosen as described previously, that is, on the basis of
higher ex interim joint surplus of the RU-cum–her licensee DUi . To understand
the incremental importance of the effects (C) and (D), we also plot the total devel-
opment expenditures, summed across DU1 and DU2, in the open mode (as if the
closed mode were exogenously ruled out).
The graphs show that indeed the effects (A) and (B) can only produce either a
monotonic (increasing for lowλ, decreasing for highλ) or a∪-shaped relationship
(for intermediate values of λ). Once we consider both modes of disclosure and
allow for effects (C) and (D), the relationship between (1 − L) and [E1 + E2]
changes qualitatively and does indeed become ∩-shaped for the low K and the
low levels of IPR.
IPR Protection and Development Expenditures. In this section we study the
effect of change in the enforcement of IPR holding the leakage from descriptionLc
constant. We reproduce the simulations for various Lo ≤ Lc. The results are very
similar. Again, for a large range of parameters we find the ∩-shaped relationship
between IPR protection and development expenditures. This relationship cannot
be explained by the open-mode effects alone.
Figure 7 shows that the relationship between IPR protection (1 − Lo) at
Lc = 0.9 and the aggregate development expenditures for different values of λ
is similar to the one in Figure 6.13 The results are robust to the choice of Lc;
the results for Lo > Lc are also similar to the ones we present. It turns out that
the most important effect behind the ∩ shape is the mode-switching effect (D):
Increased leakage in either open or closed results in a higher likelihood of the
closed mode.
Summary. To summarize, the shape of the relationship between (E1 + E2)
and Lo varies substantially with the ex ante distribution of knowledge K . For
high λ (λ ≥ 7) the relationship has a ∩ shape, but in the case of an uniform
distribution (λ = 0) the relationship is actually ∪-shaped. For intermediate values
of parameters (λ = 3) the graph is a superposition of a ∪ shape and ∩ shape.
Our numerical example is highly stylized, so it is hard to judge which values
of parameters are realistic. Still, we may presume that the range λ ∈ [3, 7] is
somewhat consistent with observed characteristics of modern R&D (see Teece
2000).
Figures 6 and 7 also illustrate the impact of IPR protection on the social
welfare and show that the mode-switching effect can indeed produce the ∩-shaped
relationship as discussed.
13. The kinks in the Figure 7 are due to the effect described in section 3.4 which emerges when
Lo is substantially below Lc.
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Figure 7. The aggregate development expenditures E = E1 +E2 and the welfare 1− (1−P1)(1−
P2) − E as a function of IPR protection Lo in the case Lc = 0.9. The bold line shows the rela-
tionship given the equilibrium (i.e., ex interim privately optimal) mode of disclosure. The thin line
is the aggregate development expenditure in the open mode (as if the closed mode were ruled out
exogenously). The three scenarios are High K (λ = 0), Medium K (λ = 3), and Low K (λ = 7).
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5. Concluding Remarks
We develop a model of two-stage cumulative R&D. RU produces nonverifiable
knowledge that has no market value per se but it can be used by DUs to create a
marketable product. Because of the nonrivalrous nature of knowledge, there is a
risk that after disclosing to one DU, RU will further disclose the information to a
competing DU. We consider two alternative mechanisms that create RU’s com-
mitment to exclusive disclosure: the “open sale” based on patenting the interim
knowledge, and the “closed sale” where precluding further sales requires the RU
to obtain a share in the licensed DU’s postinvention revenues.
An open or patented sale provides legal support for exclusive disclosure,
but it also involves leakage of a certain portion of the knowledge to the public
in the process of filing a patent application. A closed sale helps to reduce such
leakage, but the need for giving away a share of postinvention revenues to RU
weakens the licensee DU’s incentives to invest in development. We explicitly
model the extensive form bargaining in both modes of disclosure, and find that
the parties are more likely to choose the closed mode if the interim knowledge
is very valuable and intellectual property rights are not very well protected. Our
theory also generates potentially testable predictions in the structure of knowledge
licensing fees in closed sales: the more valuable the knowledge, the lower the
royalty stake.
Our model shows that there is no uniform ranking of the two knowledge dis-
closure modes in terms of overall R&D investment induced. We find that both the
comparisons of magnitude of R&D expenditures across the modes of knowledge
disclosure and the relationship between overall knowledge-development efforts
and the strength of intellectual property rights protection depend qualitatively on
the ex ante distribution of interim knowledge levels.
Our results on the impact of IPR protection in patents on a measure of social
welfare are also of considerable interest. First, we show that despite the adverse
impact of low IPR protection on the development incentives of the licensee, our
measure of social welfare is always decreasing in the strength of IPR. This is the
case despite the dissipation of developers’ rents in the event of multiple inventions
by licensee and nonlicensee developers; our result is therefore different from that
obtained by Bessen and Maskin (2000). Nevertheless, the existence of a trade-
secret-based closed mode in our model implies that the optimal degree of IPR
protection is not zero, nor even that (attainable) of the level of leakage occurring
in such closed-mode negotiations prior to licensing. The reason is that weaker
IPR protection in patents would lead to research units resorting to such closed-
mode licensing for a greater range of knowledge levels, which in turn always
harms our social welfare measure, even when the overall level of development
effort (by one as opposed to two DUs) might be increased thereby. Hence, as we
show, the extent of IPR protection that is optimal for social welfare may well
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be interior arising from endogenous choices over these two modes of knowledge
licensing.14
Throughout our paper, we have de-emphasized the incentives of first-stage
RUs to generate knowledge, and the impact of increased IPR protection thereon.
In part that is because the qualitative impact of (potential) leakage on an RU’s
payoffs can differ substantially depending on her chosen mode of knowledge
sale. The RU’s payoff is decreasing in the leakage parameter in open sales, but
possibly increasing in leakage in closed sales. Furthermore, even if increased
IPR protection augments RU’s interim payoffs, and enhances her incentives for
creation of higher levels of interim knowledge, it is far from clear that such an
effect would generate a ∩-shaped relationship between overall R&D expenditures
and the strength of IPR protection. As we have shown, such a relationship may
easily result from endogenous private choices over modes of licensing of different
levels of interim knowledge.15
Appendix: Proofs
A.1. Proof of Lemma 1
The unique subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) in the bargaining game is as
follows. RU always offers the fee above to DUi . DUi accepts the offer, because
he knows that DUj will agree to the payoff Uo after paying this fee when she is
offered the license next. Similar reasoning holds for DUj .
Indeed, let us reproduce the proof in Bolton and Whinston (1993). Conven-
tional arguments imply that in SPE, the RU’s licensing offer is accepted by DUi
in the first round. The uniqueness follows from the fact that RU chooses the con-
tinuation subgame that provides her with the highest payoff. In order to calculate
the licensing fee, let us denote {ui, uj } the DUs’ payoffs in the SPE; here i is
the DU whose turn is to be made the offer, and j is the other one. Then the
maximum possible fee DUi would pay is Fo = To − δuj ; if To − Fo < δuj ,
the DUi would turn down the offer. Therefore RU’s equilibrium strategy is to
offer Fo. As DUi accepts RU’s offer in equilibrium, the nonlicensee DU gets
uj = Uoj (Qo, Po;LoK). As δ → 1, we obtain the fee.
14. It might be argued that the overall optimal policy would be to setLo = Lc, as it might be difficult
to demand greater disclosure than this from patentees, and to ban closed-mode licensing, which is
feasible in our model because such licensing entails verifiable revenue sharing across research and
development units. However, regulatory prohibitions of such revenue-sharing contracts would harm
social welfare in situations where revenue sharing serves to incentivize simultaneous R&D efforts
by units in joint ventures, for example, as in Fulghieri and Sevilir (2004).
15. Another interesting avenue of research is to study the implications of our analysis for the
choice of the first-stage research projects. Under different circumstances, RU may prefer projects
with more/less valuable but also more/less portable knowledge (that is endogenously high/low K
and L) involving different quantity and quality of employees and different structure of research units.
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A.2. Proof of Lemma 2
The proof is straightforward. Let us first consider the case Lc < 1. For K = 0,
the incentive constraint (11) does not hold. If K > 0, the inequality turns into
2s2 − (1 + Lc)s + (1 − Lc)(1/K − 1)] ≤ 0.
Because the parties are interested in finding the lowest s that still satisfies (6), we
need to solve for the smaller root. The real root exists if and only if K ≥ Kˆ(Lc)
where Kˆ(Lc) is given by (13). In this case, the smaller root is (12).
If the leakage is complete Lc = 1 (as in Anton and Yao 1994), the incentive
constraint is always satisfied. Indeed, second sale would never be tempting for
the RU, as she would not get any revenue from DUj . In this case formulas (12)
and (13) still hold: Kˆ(1) = 0, and s∗(K; 1) = 0.
The second sale never happens in equilibrium. Indeed, suppose that the con-
tract {s, Fc} is such that RU decides to sell knowledge to DU2 as well; it is easy
to show that in this case the optimal royalty is trivial s = 0. Essentially, parties
go back to the open mode where RU sells to both DUs. As discussed above, this
outcome is dominated by the exclusive patented sale.
A.3. Proof of Proposition 1
The joint surpluses in the closed and the open modes are equal to each other at
K = 1 : Tc(1;Lc) = To(1;Lo) = 1/2. For any given L > 0 the functions
Tc(K) and To(K) may cross at most once more, at K = K∗(Lo, Lc) < 1. At this
crossing point, Tc(K) grows faster than To(K): If there is such K∗(Lo, Lc) that
Tc(K
∗(Lo, Lc);Lc) = To(K∗(Lo, Lc);Lo), then(
∂Tc
∂K
− ∂To
∂K
)∣∣∣∣
K=K∗(Lo,Lc)
> 0.
To prove this single crossing result, we consider the ratios of joint surplus T and
the “ideal” joint surplus K/2 = maxE[
√
2KE − E] in each mode (Figure 4).
In the closed mode, the surplus would be K/2 if the opportunistic disclosure
were exogenously ruled out. Straightforward calculations imply that s∗(K,Lc)
is a decreasing convex function of K (see [12]). Therefore the ratio Tc/(K/2) =
1 − s∗(K,Lc)2 is an increasing concave function of K .
In the open mode, K/2 is the surplus in the absence of leakage. Hence the
ratio To/(K/2) reflects the expropriation of the joint surplus by the nonlicensee
development. As discussed above, the nonlicensee DUj ’s effort first increases
in K , and then falls. Not surprisingly, To/(K/2) is convex (and strictly convex
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for all Lo > 0). Indeed, To/(K/2) is convex if (1−LoK)/(1−LoK2) is convex.
But
∂2
∂K2
(
1 − LoK
1 − LoK2
)
= 2Lo
[
1 − L2oK3 + 3LoK2 − 3LoK
]
(1 − LoK2)3
is non-negative: the terms in brackets can be rearranged as
Lo(1 − K)3 + (1 − Lo)(1 + LoK3).
Because Tc/(K/2) is concave and To/(K/2) is convex, and both are equal to 1
at K = 1, there can be three cases:
(i) Tc/(K/2) < To/(K/2) for all Kˆ(Lc) ≤ K < 1;
(ii) Tc/(K/2) > To/(K/2) for all Kˆ(Lc) ≤ K < 1;
(iii) there exists K∗ ∈ (Kˆ(Lc), 1) such that Tc/(K/2)<To/(K/2) for all K ∈
(Kˆ(Lc),K
∗) and Tc/(K/2) > To/(K/2) for all K ∈ (K∗, 1).
The cases (ii) and (iii) are the two versions of the single crossing described in the
Proposition. In order to rule out case (i), let us consider K sufficiently close to 1.
If K → 1, then (5) and (14) imply that
Tc →
[
K/2 − (1 − K)2K(1 − Lc)2/(2(1 + Lc)2)
]
,
To → [K/2 − (1 − K)Lo/(1 − Lo)].
Therefore for any Lo > 0, there exists a range of K sufficiently close to 1 such
that Tc > To.
A.4. Proof of Proposition 3
Using (4) we find that the social welfare in the open mode,
Po(1 − Qo) + Qo(1 − Po) + PoQo − P
2
o
2K
− Q
2
o
2LK
= K(1 − LoK)
2
2(1 − LoK2)2 +
LoK(1 − K)2
2(1 − LoK2)2 +
LoK
2(1 − LoK)(1 − K)
(1 − LoK2)2
= K
2
(1 − LoK)2 + Lo(1 − K)2 + 2LoK(1 − LoK)(1 − K)
(1 − LoK2)2
= K
2
(1 − LoK2)2 + Lo(1 − K)2 − L2oK2(1 − K)2
(1 − LoK2)2
= K
2
(
1 + Lo(1 − K)
2
1 − LoK2
)
,
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is always above K/2 and is an increasing function of Lo. Its first derivative with
regard to K equals
(1 − LoK)2 + Lo(1 − K)2
2(1 − LoK2)2
and is therefore non-negative.
According to (14), the welfare in the closed mode Tc increases in K and Lc
and is always below K/2.
A.5. Proof of Proposition 4
One can easily show that dEo/dL> 0 whenever Lo >(K)≡ (3K−1)K−2(3−
K)−1. The right hand side (K) increases with K for all K ∈ [0, 1] with
(1/3) = 0 and (1) = 1. Hence for all K ≤ 1/3, effort Eo is decreasing
in Lo, whereas for K ∈ (1/3, 1) effort is ∪-shaped with the minimum point at
Lo = (K).
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